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KRIPKENSTEIN FROM THE MATHEMATICAL POINT OF 
VIEW: A PRELIMINARY SURVEY 
 
1 After the beginning 
The aim of this paper is very modest. In the first few sections I would like 
to review and comment on the debate about non-factualism in the 
philosophy of mathematics. First, I will explain whether this kind of 
debate – closely tied to the debate about meaning – is applicable to such 
an exceptional field of inquiry. I would argue that, albeit allowing that 
some clarifications and alternative definitions should be settled, the 
debate about non-factualism is crucial in this field. Second, I would like to 
outline the boundaries of the general inquiry and, in order to do so, I will 
list some of the main problems connected to the aforementioned debate 
and try to put some of them aside with the proper commentary, the 
rationale being the introductory character of this paper. 
Although a certain interpretation of the skeptical solution to Kripke’s 
puzzle will be provided in this paper, a more precise formulation and 
critique of the dispositionalism in the philosophy of mathematics will not 
appear. The aim of this study is to deal with the (non-)factualist stance 
and the debate concerning dispositions in this area is far too wide 
ranging for this elaboration. The paper will also touch briefly on the 
problem of meaning in the philosophy of mathematics. I will provide the 
necessary definitions, especially when dealing with Dummett’s version of 
intuitionism, but in my opinion the problem is much deeper and probably 
unsolvable in the first-order language of mathematics. For a fuller analysis 
of this problem, one could see [Shapiro 1991] The last topic that I would 
like to indicate here is the problem of the relation between global and 
local viewpoints in the philosophy of mathematics. I will address this 
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issue during my elaboration of (non-)factualism and it should be regarded 
as purely an introductory survey. 
2 Kripke’s skeptical paradox?  
In his famous and broadly commented upon essay about Wittgenstein 
and rule–following, Saul Kripke struck at the very foundations of meaning 
determinism in the theory of meaning [Kripke 1982] [Kusch 2006]. In 
the first part of this essay I would like to outline and explicitly state what 
was the target of Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s rule-following 
considerations and to which concept much of the damage was done. 
The firsts step would be a brief presentation of meaning determinism 
based on M. Kusch’s elaboration of the starting point of Kripke’s critique 
[Kusch 2006]. Meaning determinism could be briefly stated as the thesis 
that:  
Definition. 1 [Kusch 2006,  4]1 Meaning determinism holds that sentences 
of the form ’person x means Y by sign ’z” are true if, and only if, x has 
certain mental state that constitutes x’s meaning Y by ’z’.  
 Having stated meaning determinism, we can see how it was attacked 
by Kripke: suppose that we define ’plus’ as an addition function in usual 
way and we further define ’quus’ function: x⊕y=x+y if x,y<57 and 
x⊕y=5 otherwise  
The skeptical question is: in the past, do we mean plus or quus by the 
symbol ’+’? It appears that in my past, there was no fact justifying the 
meaning of the ’+’ sign. To face this paradox, one could formulate a 
'straight' or 'skeptical' solution to it. The straight solution to the paradox 
tries to dissolve the paradox by pointing out the flaw of the original 
argument2. The skeptical solution accepts the paradoxical conclusion that 
there are no genuine facts about meaning and thus different criteria 
must be built for meaning-discourse. Skipping the prima-facie answers 
to the challenge, Kripke, after an elaboration of the various types of high-
                                                 
1 This formulation is called by Kusch low–brow meaning determinism, while views 
that attempt to give it theoretical precision are called high–brow meaning 
determinism. The usability of this distinction will not be pursued in this essay but I 
will be adopting this distinction 
2 “A straight, or normal, solution, he says, would be the discovery of some mistake in 
the argument—for example, the calling of attention to some further kind of fact, not 
previously noticed, that would satisfy the adequacy conditions.” [Horwich 1998,  
213] 
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brow meaning determinism, concludes that there is no fact that could 
support the answer that anyone could mean something by uttering a 
sentence [Kripke 1982, 9].3 The view that we could not answer the 
skeptical question fuels Kripke’s non-factualism and, from mere 
epistemological non-factualism, Kripke is deriving the thesis that non-
factualism is constitutional (metaphysical) in essence. I will not discuss 
at this point the obvious connection of Kripke’s survey on the high-brow 
meaning-determinisms to the philosophy of mathematics i.e. Kripke’s 
objection to the meaning-platonism, this issue will be elaborated in the 
next part. On this basis Kripke is trying to provide a skeptical solution to 
his puzzle:4  
The skeptical solution has two parts that are usefully distinguished. The 
first consists in the suggestion that we replace the notion of truth 
conditions, in our intuitive picture of sentence meaning, by that of 
assertability conditions. The second consists in a description of the 
assertability conditions for meaning-attributing sentences, in the course of 
which it is argued that it is essential to such sentences that their 
assertability conditions advert to the actions or dispositions of a 
community. [Boghossian 1989, 518]  
First of all, it appears that if we accept Kripke's thesis that there can be 
no mental states that are meaning, we have to also accept the thesis that 
no classical-realist fact whatsoever can play this role [Kusch 2006, 25]. 
Kripke’s idea is to apply the assertability conditions to interpret 
discourse and to turn to the communal usage of the language. The 
second main thesis advocated by Kripke is that the answer to the 
question about meaning in skeptical problems forces an answer to the 
metaphysical question about facts. This thesis will be subsequently 
withdrawn and replaced with more appropriate one. In addition, the 
minimal factualist account of the Kripkean solution will be advocated. 
Agreeing with the thesis that meaning plays a central role in Kripke’s 
inquiry, we are now ready to draw some distinctions concerning the 
problem of meaning in mathematics. 
                                                 
3 [Kusch 2006] priovides the necessary introduction and [Ryle 1951] could serve as 
basic reading for dispositionalist account. 
4 One could discuss the meaning of the term truth-conditions. Truth- conditions are 
part of the intuitive picture of meaning determinism, and as such, should be 
addressed by a skeptical solution. 
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3 Meaning and objectivity in mathematics 
The first point of the analysis of Kripke’s move in mathematics will be a 
short elaboration of the problems with meaning and objectivity in 
mathematics. According to Dummett’s interpretation, we could distinct 
different types of interpretation of the concept of meaning in 
mathematics. First of all, we could adopt the skeptical solution sketched 
above to its full extent and advocate that the meaning of mathematical 
statement determines and is exhaustively determined by its use 
[Dummett 1973, 216]. I will delay dwelling on the criticism of this 
interpretation until the next section. The second type of the 
interpretation of meaning is interpretation via the learning of the 
mathematics. Dummett argues that this interpretation is closely 
connected to the computational aspect of mathematics [Dummett 
1973, 216]. For this account we could provide two crucial problems. First 
of all, if we are denying the classical notion of truth in mathematics, to 
what extent is this interpretation more suitable than the first one?  
Secondly, if we hold with the notion of truth then one may ask if the 
truth-value of the simple arithmetical problem is settled with proper 
computation, how could we be sure that the equation was true before the 
computation or how could it be true?  [Dummett 1973, 233]. The third 
type of interpretation involves a Platonic account that will tie the notion 
of the grasping of meaning to the notion of truth. Potential problems with 
this interpretation are similar to the problems with meaning-
determinism according to Kripke’s critique. Prima-facie, Platonism 
cannot be saved from the skeptical argument but, as it will be argued 
later, a certain version could be salvaged from it [Dummett 1973, 233]. 
The fourth type of interpretation is that the meaning of a mathematical 
statement consists of the capacity to recognize the proof of it. I will 
withhold the precise elaboration of the problems tied to the ’use is proof ’ 
thesis for this essay — the most important issue is to distinguish the 
differing conception of meaning in mathematics between those 
interpretations. 
Meaning in mathematics is inseparable from the notion of truth and is 
closely tied to the notion of objectivity. Before the final part of this essay, 
three concepts of objectivity should be elaborated and their different 
mathematical stances distinguished. According to [Wright 1993] we 
could speak of three different notions of objectivity. First, we could talk 
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about the objectivity of truth, defined by saying that a class of statements 
may be fully intelligible to the speaker although resolving truth-values 
may be beyond the scope of an agent’s cognitive abilities. Second, we 
could recognize the objectivity of meaning by saying that: “the notion of 
the meaning of a statement is a real constraint, to which we are bound 
[…] and to which verdicts about its truth-value may objectively conform, 
or fail to conform, quite independently of our considered opinion on the 
matter.” [Wright 1993, 5] And third, we could speak of an objectivity of 
judgement, the feature that statements possess when they record the 
features of the real world (statements with “genuine factual” subject 
matter) [Wright 1993, 6]. In this setting, the objectivity of truth implies 
the objectivity of meaning and judgement.5  
Returning to the main problem, we should ask about the possible 
connection between meaning and objectivity in mathematics. The 
current inquiry places us in a position to only deal with the objectivity of 
meaning in mathematics. Why is this so? First of all, the issue of the 
objectivity of judgement will need the close elaboration of the notion of 
‘mathematical’ reality and so will require us to deal with the problem of 
the existence of mathematical objects which we put aside. Second, the 
problem of the objectivity of truth, implying both the objectivity of 
meaning and judgement, will require an analogous effort from us. The 
objectivity of meaning, treated independently, is vulnerable via the notion 
of truth-conditions to Kripke’s skeptical argument. What is more, the 
transition from the local to a global viewpoint and from the thesis about 
meaning to the thesis about metaphysics is the subject of extensive 
critique [Kusch 2006] [Posłajko 2012] and one should not adopt it in 
mathematical discourse without further inquiry.   
                                                 
5 One important distinction should be added and a whole class of possible problems 
excluded from the present inquiry. In this paper, the thesis that the objectivity of 
truth in mathematics and the status of mathematical objects are separate is adopted. 
The question concerning the reality of mathematical objects and its relation to the 
notion of the truth in mathematics is far more complex than it is possible to deal 
with in this essay and we could argue that the matter of the objectivity of truth is 
more important in the subsequent discussion [Wright 1993, 9] [Dummett 1973, 
228]. 
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4 The consequences of Kripke’s move 
Having presented the ’classical’ interpretation of Kripke’s problem and 
the solution to it, we have adopted metaphysical non-factualism as 
advocated by Kripke 6. Before we move to a possible interpretation of this 
thesis in the philosophy of mathematics, its irrefutability should be settled 
yet this is impossible. Boghossian, in his critique of Kripke’s solution, 
presented proof that local non-factualism could not be the case and from 
this he derived the thesis that only robust realism could serve as the 
right conception of meaning [Boghossian 1989, 507 and 549].7 From this 
conclusion we could derive the view that the Kripke-like analysis of 
mathematical discourse will result in the adoption of the Platonistic 
stance yet this is not the case as well. M. Kusch’s precis of a C. Wright 
argument [Kusch 2006, 151] against Boghossian’s interpretation opened 
up the issue of the factualist interpretation of Kripke’s problem and its 
solution.8 The core of the simplest of the two arguments is the claim that 
the non-factualist thesis about meaning must apply to itself and, as such, 
it cannot acclaim to have made a discovery about language [Kusch 
2006, 155]. Boghossian’s refutation of non-factualism fails and his 
argument in favor of robust realism is therefore not valid. [Kusch 2006] 
pointed out that the alleged inconsistency of the interpretation of the 
skeptical solution could be avoided. Realism could still be challenged by 
the classical Kripke argument, but the skeptical solution would be stated 
in a non-factual way.9 
                                                 
6 Part of the strategy to refute local non-factualism is to maintain the thesis that local 
non-factualism leads straight to global non factualism according to Kripke 
[Boghossian 1989]. Boghossian, however, fails to elaborate this ‘straight’ way as 
pointed out by [Kusch 2006, 151–154] and [Wilson 1994]. 
7 An important methodological remark should be made. Boghossian and Kripke use 
negative-enumeration arguments to  attack opponents. The positive thesis of the 
opponent is formulated and its possible extensions are surveyed. From this, 
conclusions are drawn and possible viewpoints supporting this thesis are 
formulated and the inconsistency of them is proven. On that basis, the alternative 
thesis to the positive thesis stated in the beginning is adopted as the only solution to 
the problem. Both of them are not generating general arguments against the main 
theses of the opponent. This was pointed out in [Posłajko 2012]. 
8 See also [Posłajko 2012]. 
9 One comment should be made to make things clear. We are talking about the 
refutation of Boghossian’s argument against the non-factualism and yet we are 
providing another argument supporting the same conclusion, why is this so? The 
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Many of the commenting authors advocate the use of the minimal 
factualist thesis as the proper interpretation of Kripke’s account [Kusch 
2006,  175–176] [Posłajko 2012, 156]. The thesis could be stated that 
meaning scepticism advocates a minimal, deflationary10 form of 
factualism: 
 
(i) A normal declarative sentence (“normal” judged by communal 
criteria) is  meaningful for an interpreter if, and only if, he is able to 
make out, in his own  terms, what the sentence says (here the 
interpreter will be guided by assertability conditions). If it is 
correct to say: “what the sentence says is true”, then it is also 
correct to say “what the sentence says is a fact”. A sentence is true if 
 what it says is true. 
 
(ii) A speaker understands a sentence s if he knows what that 
sentence says or states (in the present context). And hence he 
knows that s is true if he knows that what the sentence says or 
states is true. [Kusch 2006, 176]11  
 
Unfortunately this thesis – due to the limited scope of this essay – should 
be established without proof12. It is not difficult to see that this thesis 
blocks from one perspective the Platonic interpretation of meaning and, 
at the same time, also saves meaning from non-factualism and this turns 
out to be inconsistent. The implications for mathematics will be provided 
in the next section. 
                                                                                                                             
first point is that Boghossian’s formulation of the problem supports the robust 
realism conclusion and robust realism could be simply attacked by Kripke’s sceptic. 
Secondly, a better argument against non-factualism was formulated by [Wright 
1984] and approached by [Kusch 2006, 155–156] and this one was used to support 
a thesis distinct from the robust realism. 
10 If we adopt a “deflationary” view of truth we deny that “true” stands for a language-
independent property and insist that its meaning is exhausted by the certain 
syntactic–semantic operations it allows for [Kusch 2006, 151]. 
11 Deflationary and inflationary theses about meaning were elaborated in [Boghossian 
1990]. The variety of deflationistic theories of truth could be developed within a 
mathematical framework, within this essay a particular version of deflationism will 
be used.  
12 For a detailed view on that matter see: [Kusch 2006, 148–176] [Posłajko 2012, 156–
181] 
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5 What does it mean for mathematics?  
In this section I would like to deal with the possible interpretations of 
solutions for meaning scepticism. I will try to briefly introduce Platonism 
in two variations and intuitionism13. 
Full-blooded Platonism could be stated as a simple thesis that:  
Definition 2 the subject matter of mathematics consists of non-reducible, 
objective abstract entities  
The first thing to notice is that the standard formulation of this thesis is 
rather about the objectivity of truth issue than objectivity of meaning. 
One should keep in mind that we will be dealing with the meaning 
problem and this thesis should be interpreted as a thesis about meaning. 
I will not be specifying the general problems connected with this view 
but would like to settle for its Kripkean interpretation. In the simplest 
possible view, by accepting full-blooded Platonism we are condemned to 
(robust) factualism and to the meaning as grasping thesis which was 
attacked by Kripke’s sceptic. The first part could be overcome due to 
Kusch’s interpretation of Kripke’s problem, but the second part is 
immediately attacked and crushed by the sceptic:  
For Wittgenstein, Platonism is largely an unhelpful evasion of the problem 
of how our finite minds can give rules that are supposed to apply to an 
infinity of cases. Platonic objects may be self-interpreting, or rather, they 
may need no interpretation; but ultimately there must be some mental 
entity involved that raises the skeptical problem. [Kripke 1982, 54]  
An important thing to mention is that if Boghossian’s account were 
refined and defended, we would have no problems with robust realism 
and Platonism. However, being unable to refine Boghossian’s position, we 
could try to refine Platonism. The second version of Platonism will be far 
removed from Boghossian’s view and this is achieved by adopting 
deflating Platonism [Tait 2005]. This view could be stated as:  
Definition 3 [...]proposition A is true hen there is an object of type A, and 
that a proof of it is the construction of such an object [Tait 2005, 79]  
                                                 
13 I will not be discussing Logicism and the different versions of constructivism for 
two reasons. Firstly, Logicism seems to be a purely extrinsic view on the relation of 
mathematics and logic, dealing mostly with some formal aspects and not a 
metaphysical stance. Secondly, the problem of Kripke’s interpretation could be 
accurately interpreted within an intuitionistic framework which could be perceived 
as canonical for constructivism. The problem of the interpretation of other 
constructive accounts is beyond the scope of this inquiry. 
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We have a clear connection between the notion of truth and the notion of 
proof which resembles Dummett’s account but Tait also claims that the 
existence of the object states a fact but from within the mathematical 
framework. Tait is closely related to the internal/external questions of 
the framework, a distinction made by Carnap [Horsten 2012]. Deflating 
Platonism fits perfectly into the framework determined by Kusch’s 
minimal interpretation of Kripkenstein. Moreover, Tait’s view on the 
external questions of the mathematical framework (mainly 
philosophical) supports the view that mathematics needs no 
philosophical inquiry and could settle the problem of the existence of its 
objects by itself. This is the main advantage and weakness of Tait’s 
proposition. One could ask about the criterion of the existence of 
mathematical objects in different domains and for the possibility of the 
unification of mathematics and Tait would say that the distance between 
them prevents the possibility of unification. The criterion of existence is 
beyond the current limits of investigation but unification should truly be 
the case. For the Platonist, this absence is counterintuitive. The major 
objection to Tait's criterion of existence is that for Platonism the 
existence of the object always seems to be external to the proposed 
semantic framework. For Tait, everything could be settled from within 
this domain and thus we are presented with the vicious circle problem.14 
The next possible interpretation of meaning in mathematics is the 
“meaning as proof” thesis connected with the intuitionist stance in the 
philosophy of mathematics. The main advocate of this stance would be M. 
Dummett who advocates adopting assertabilist semantics to all languages 
in general and thus to mathematical language as a special case [Shapiro 
2007, 324]. Dummett has two strong arguments in favor of his account. 
Firstly, he introduces the language acquisition argument, namely that 
during language acquisition we only learn assertability conditions and 
they define our grasp of the meaning, and secondly, a pragmatic 
argument that only assertability conditions allows us to demonstrate an 
understanding of language [Shapiro 2007, 324]. Having those arguments 
in support of some interpretation of Kripke’s solution one could advocate 
that:  
                                                 
14 Tait’s deflationism should not be confused with deflationism about mathematics, 
developed by H. Field [Field 1980]. The latter argues that the whole of mathematics 
is deflationary, not only the notion of truth within mathematics. 
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mathematical statement is intuitionistically true if there exists an 
(intuitionistic) proof of it, where the existence of a proof does not consist in 
its platonic existence in a realm outside space and time, but in our actual 
possession of it [Dummett 1973, 239]  
Dummett’s view on the nature of Kripke’s skeptical problem which was 
provided earlier strongly suggests this conclusion. S. Shapiro argues that 
the adoption of the use theory of meaning does not necessarily lead to 
Dummett’s conclusions [Shapiro 1991, 212] but it follows from it that 
ontology and truth conditions must be compatible with language 
acquisition i.e. the understanding and learnability of it. The second point 
is that Shapiro's view is compatible with the very model–theoretical 
semantics which was attacked by Dummett. This could be refuted by 
saying that the grasp of the model theory is mediated by its informal 
usage and thus it is a practice of mathematicians to grasp concepts by 
usage [Shapiro 1991, 213]. This proves that we have more than the 
Kusch-related problems to consider with the basics of the intuitionism 
formulated by Dummett. The main problem with Dummet’s stance, and 
of relevance to Kripke’s skeptical problem, could be tied to the notion of 
fact. Dummett’s intuitionism is not fully compatible with the skeptical 
solution because he is not devoted to the non-factualist thesis. He rather 
argues that facts about meaning consist of facts about assertability 
conditions.15 Dummett is also advocate of the use of the thesis that can 
be formulated as follows: 
Thesis 1 [Use Thesis] One understands the concepts embodied in a 
language to the extent that one knows how to use the language correctly 
[Shapiro 1991, 211]. 
The notion of understanding ties the notion of meaning to the problem of 
learning and grasping the concepts. This leads to the problem with 
semantics by the need for replacement of truth conditions by proof 
conditions [Dummett 1973]. 
Dummett’s view is incompatible with the skeptical solution to the 
paradox but the question of whether it is incompatible with a minimalist 
interpretation is more complex. One could argue that the factual nature of 
Dummet’s intuitionsm is similar to the minimalist interpretation of 
factualism but, at the same time, Dummett’s program is against any 
realist interpretation of the discourse and is thus incompatible with this 
                                                 
15 I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for pointing out this issue. 
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interpretation. But again, we should point out the issue of the relation 
between the objectivity of truth and objectivity of meaning. The 
objectivity of meaning thesis, by limiting the scope of the inquiry, could 
serve as a common ground for adopting both a minimalist interpretation 
and Dummett’s factual use thesis but the point of divergence will still be 
present in the usage of truth-conditions in the definition. I will leave this 
elaboration with the question of whether a change in the definition could 
be made to enable the possibility of merging those two viewpoints. By 
using the notion of meaning facts, intuitionism is vulnerable to the 
skeptical paradox but, by a close elaboration of it and thanks to a 
minimalist answer, it could remain unaffected by it. Sadly, intuitionism is 
also incompatible with the proposed solution and the validity of its core 
theses are a constant object of philosophical debate.  
From those brief considerations about the possible interpretation of 
Kripke’s skeptical problem and its solution from the mathematical point 
of view we could draw the following . If we are interpreting the thesis 
metaphysically from the realm of meaning then we would obtain strong 
constraints for any mathematical theory which we would like it to 
encompass. That is because the concept of meaning in mathematics is 
vulnerable to Kripke’s skeptical problem. I have been arguing that from 
Kusch’s point of view we would rather obtain a peculiar version of 
Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics but the peculiarity of this 
solution could be non-intuitive and, as such, could not be satisfactory. The 
prominent stances in the philosophy of mathematics (full-blooded 
Platonism and intuitionalism) are vulnerable to Kripke’s critique and 
should be revisited and refined. Of those two, only deflationary Platonism 
is consistent with Kusch’s interpretation of the solution to Kripke’s 
problem. Due to the limited scope of this paper I would like to advocate 
the thesis that the problem of non-factualism should be addressed and 
resolved by any philosophical stance in mathematics that would like to be 
global in character.  
6 Conclusions 
Thus we can draw some conclusions. Having analyzed Kripke’s skeptical 
problem and its skeptical solution, I then turned to the issue of meaning 
in mathematics and concluded that it is vulnerable to Kripke’s skeptical 
problem. Through the possible changes in the (non-)factualist 
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interpretation of Kripke’s analysis I was able to formulate a framework in 
which the main positions in the philosophy of mathematics could be 
analyzed and I conducted an analysis. Finally, I was able to identify the 
most accurate interpretation of mathematics that turns out to be globally 
unintuitive but which fits Kusch’s interpretation of Kripke’s skeptical 
problem well. The scope of this survey enforced the conclusion that any 
global theory of the philosophy of mathematics should resolve Kripke’s 
(non-)factualist account of meaning. 
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ABSTRACT 
KRIPKENSTEIN FROM THE MATHEMATICAL POINT OF VIEW: A 
PRELIMINARY SURVEY 
This paper deals with the problem of the impact of Kripke’s skeptical 
paradox on the philosophy of mathematics. By perceiving mathematics as 
a huge rule-following discipline, one could argue that the Kripkean non-
factualist thesis should be adopted within the philosophy of mathematics 
en bloc to imply a refutation of objectivity and an enforcement of a 
particular view on the nature of mathematics. In this paper I will discuss 
this claim. According to Kripke’s skeptical solution we should reject the 
notion of fact and adopt the use theory of meaning that could be stated as 
follows: ’One understands the concepts embodied in a language to the 
extent that one knows how to use the language correctly.’ [Shapiro 
1991, 211] [Kripke 1982]. Focusing on mathematical discourse, we 
should ask: what are the implications of the use theory of meaning for 
the philosophy of mathematics? Furthermore, is the answer to the 
skeptical paradox consistent with selected views in philosophy of 
mathematics? The supposed answer to the first question is that it 
demands the view that mathematics should be perceived as a strictly 
pragmatic discipline and the rules of mathematical discourse are mere 
conventions. But this is too simplistic a view and the matter at hand is far 
more complicated.    
KEYWORDS: Kripke, philosophy of mathematics, non-factualism, 
Platonism 
 
